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Conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh:	The	Azerbaijani
perspective	on	the	route	to	peace
Since	the	end	of	September,	the	conflict	between	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	over	the	region	of	Nagorno-Karabakh
has	been	reignited.	Rovshan	Ibrahimov	and	Murad	Muradov	present	the	Azerbaijani	perspective	on	the	roots	of
the	current	escalation	and	the	way	forward	to	a	peaceful	resolution.
Between	1988-94,	in	the	shadow	of	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union,	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	fought	a	war	within
the	borders	of	Azerbaijan.	The	outcome	was	the	occupation	of	the	enclave	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	–	where	there
was	at	that	time	and	remains	today	an	ethnic	Armenian	majority	–	and	an	additional	seven	neighbouring	districts
surrounding	Nagorno-Karabakh	where	Azerbaijanis	had	always	constituted	an	overwhelming	majority.	As	a	result	of
the	invasion,	600,000	ethnic	Azeris	lost	their	homes	and	became	Internally	Displaced	Persons	(IDPs).	A	further
400,000	Azeri	refugees	also	fled	their	homes	within	Armenia	to	Azerbaijan	as	a	result	of	persecution.
The	debate	over	the	cultural	ownership	and	heritage	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	the	seven	occupied	territories	are
today	subject	to	widespread	debate	–	but	not	widespread	appreciation	of	the	historical	facts.	It	cannot	be	disputed
that	both	Azerbaijani	and	Armenian,	Christian	and	Muslim	history	and	culture	run	deep	across	this	region	and	for
over	one	and	a	half	thousand	years.	It	is	perhaps	though	to	be	expected	that	the	further	the	journey	is	taken	back
into	that	history,	the	further	it	becomes	subject	to	mythmaking.
Yet	wind	forward	to	the	1988-94	Armenia-Azerbaijan	conflict,	and	the	facts	are	much	clearer:	that	balance	was
broken	by	the	mass	eviction	of	one	ethnic	group	by	and	in	favour	of	another,	with	the	current	ethnic	make-up	further
majoritised	by	the	re-location	over	the	last	two	decades	of	tens	of	thousands	of	additional	Armenians	to	the
occupied	territories	from	Armenia	itself.	The	organised	re-engineering	of	the	ethnic	balance	of	these	territories	was
indeed	decisively	condemned	at	the	time,	when	in	2005	the	Council	of	Europe’s	Parliamentary	Assembly	(PACE)
condemned	in	the	strongest	possible	terms	“large-scale	ethnic	expulsion	and	the	creation	of	mono-ethnic	areas
which	resemble	the	terrible	concept	of	ethnic	cleansing”	(Resolution	1416).
Negotiation
Negotiations	have	in	theory	been	taking	place	ever	since	the	1994	ceasefire,	mediated	by	the	Organization	for
Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	(OSCE)	Minsk	Group	–	co-chaired	by	the	United	States,	Russia	and	France,
and	founded	in	1992,	while	the	last	conflict	was	still	being	fought.
The	Minsk	Group	set	out	with	the	good	intentions	of	resolving	the	conflict	within	the	fundamental	framework	of	the
United	Nations	Security	Council	resolutions	822,	853,	874	and	884,	requiring	the	urgent	withdrawal	of	Armenian
armed	forces	from	the	occupied	Azerbaijani	territories.	This	has	never	happened.	It	is	the	failure	of	the	Minsk	Group
process	that	has	directly	led	to	the	current	conflict.
Essentially	this	brings	to	the	forefront	of	the	return	of	the	fighting	today	a	fundamental	question	over	priorities	for	the
international	community:	what	matters	most,	principles	of	international	law,	or	the	acceptance	of	de	facto	situations
which	are	at	odds	with	those	principles?
Territorial	integrity	vs	the	1991	‘referendum’
In	1991,	some	three	years	before	the	end	of	the	last	conflict,	while	the	war	still	raged	–	but	after	the	forced	ejection
by	Armenian	forces	of	hundreds	of	thousands	of	ethnic	Azeris	–	an	illegal	‘independence	referendum’	was	held	in
Nagorno-Karabakh.	The	fact	that	the	war	was	still	ongoing	and	that	the	only	voters	were	the	ethnic	majority	and
their	supporting	occupying	forces	should	alone	be	enough	to	conclusively	reject	the	result.	Yet	added	to	that,	we
can	see	parallels	with	the	cases	of	Catalonia,	Scotland	or	Corsica	where	independence	referendums	cannot	be
held	without	the	consent	of	the	Spanish,	UK	or	French	governments	respectively	–	these	being	the	legally
recognised	sovereign	countries	of	which	those	territories	are	constituent	parts.	For	the	1991	referendum	to	have
any	validity,	it	required	the	consent	of	the	Azerbaijan	Government,	and	that	consent	was	quite	obviously	not	given.
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Referring	to	Article	72	of	the	1977	Soviet	constitutional	law	(which	was	still	in	place,	with	the	USSR	existent	in
1991)	the	right	for	unilateral	secession	was	retained	exclusively	by	15	constituent	republics,	but	not	for	lower-level
administrative	entities	–	and	not	for	Oblasts,	of	which	Nagorno-Karabakh	was	one.
Even	more	decisively,	on	the	international	stage,	not	a	single	UN	member	state	has	ever	recognised	the	validity	of
the	vote,	with	the	unsurprising	result	that	the	‘Republic’	remains	to	this	day	unrecognised	by	any	country.	Even	the
Republic	of	Armenia	has	not	granted	recognition	to	Nagorno-Karabakh,	nor	sought	to	publicly	contradict	this	tenet
in	international	law.	Additionally,	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	commenting	in	2015	on	the	Chiragov	and
others	v.	Armenia	case	regarding	the	property	rights	of	Azerbaijani	nationals	living	in	the	district	of	Lachin	currently
under	occupation,	ruled	that	Armenia	had	been	exercising	effective	control	over	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	without	any
legal	basis	in	international	law	to	do	so.
The	evolving,	regressing	Armenian	position
It	is	known	that	the	first	President	of	Armenia,	Levon	Ter-Petrosyan,	had	a	pragmatic	view	regarding	the	resolution
of	the	conflict.	Ter-Petrosyan	clearly	understood	the	future	prospects	of	Armenia	–	landlocked	without	direct	sea
access,	and	without	an	abundance	of	natural	resources	–	were	limited	without	better	relations	with	its	neighbours.
To	improve	them	he	sought	better	relations	specifically	with	Azerbaijan	and	Turkey,	seeking	Armenia’s	participation
in	regional	infrastructure	projects,	including	the	transportation	of	energy	resources.
Despite	the	fact	that	Ter-Petrosyan	actively	participated	in	the	negotiations	to	resolve	the	conflict,	the	growing
presence	of	nationalists	in	the	Armenian	government	who	publicly	supported	Nagorno-Karabakh	separation	and
separatists	stymied	his	attempts	at	resolution.	When	in	1998	Ter-Petrosyan	was	forced	to	resign,	that	initial
progress	went	with	him.
Hopes	were	again	raised	twenty	years	later	with	the	2018	election	of	current	Armenian	Prime	Minister,	Nikol
Pashinyan,	brought	to	power	on	the	wave	of	the	‘velvet	revolution’	–	a	nationwide	mass	protest	movement	against
institutionalised	corruption,	lack	of	freedoms	and	economic	stress.
It	was	widely	expected	by	the	international	community	that	Pashinyan	would	be	an	ally	in	supporting	the
negotiations,	held	in	the	preceding	years	between	Azerbaijan	and	Armenia	with	the	mediation	of	the	Minsk	Group,
which	had	led	to	what	is	known	as	the	‘Madrid	Principles’.	These	state	that	the	seven	occupied	regions	adjacent	to
Nagorno-Karabakh	should	be	liberated	and	restored	to	Azerbaijani	control,	a	corridor	should	be	formed	between
Armenia	and	Karabakh,	and	the	subsequent	status	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	should	be	determined	on	the	consensual
basis	of	the	Azerbaijani	and	Armenian	communities	of	Karabakh.
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It	is	now	clear	these	hopes	have	been	dashed.	Far	from	being	the	progressive	force	that	was	expected,	Pashinyan
has	sabotaged	the	process	by	demanding	the	inclusion	of	representatives	of	the	unrecognised	‘Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic’,	to	the	dismay	of	the	three	national	co-chairs	of	the	Minsk	Group.	Further	regression	to	a	nationalistic
position	was	evident	in	abundance	when	Pashinyan	visited	Karabakh	and	surprised	observers	with	his	public
declaration	that	“Karabakh	is	Armenia”.
The	way	forward
At	a	time	of	armed	conflict,	against	the	tragic	background	of	thirty	years	of	invasion,	occupation,	and	resistance,	it
requires	both	vision	and	courage	to	work	toward	a	better	future	beyond	the	battlefield.	Yet	the	core	principles	on
which	that	future	can	be	built	are	well	known.	They	are	the	principles	that	have	been	the	Minsk	Group’s	basis	for
negotiations	for	nearly	three	decades;	they	reflect	the	UN	Security	Council’s	resolutions,	as	well	as	the	positions	of
countless	international	bodies	–	from	the	UN’s	own	General	Assembly	to	the	European	Parliament;	and	they,
inevitably,	would	result	in	the	withdrawal	of	Armenian	forces	from	Azerbaijan.
With	that	in	place,	the	region	can	and	must	return	to	its	true	multi-faith,	multi-cultural	and	multi-ethnic	character.
Clearly	this	will	not	be	easy.	But	it	is	possible:	already	an	example	exists	in	today’s	Azerbaijan	itself	–	where	ethnic
Azeris	live	with	some	30,000	Armenians	(not	including	those	in	the	occupied	territories),	Russians,	Turks,	Lezgins,
Avars,	Talyshs,	Georgians,	Tsakhurs	and	more.	Azerbaijan’s	leadership	has	made	it	clear	what	is	on	offer.
The	legitimate	ethnic	Armenian	population	will	be	fully	recognised	and	protected	as	citizens	of	Azerbaijan,	and	they
will	be	joined	by	those	of	their	former	ethnic	Azeri	neighbours	who	choose	to	exercise	their	right,	as	refugees,	to
return.	Homes,	towns	and	villages	razed	to	the	ground	both	by	previous	conflict,	and	today’s,	must	be	rebuilt.	The
horrors	of	a	grey	state,	existing	outside	the	norms	of	international	law,	can	be	addressed:	environmental	abuses
and	drug	trafficking	–	well-documented	under	the	occupation	–	must	be	tackled,	and	cease.	The	future	holds	a
promise	for	economic,	cultural	and	environmental	renewal	in	this	remote	mountain	region,	a	renewal	whose	positive
effects	will	be	felt	far	beyond.
Armenia’s	tragedy	is	that	is	has	been	painted	by	the	rhetoric	of	its	leaders	into	an	impossible,	indefensible	corner.
The	country’s	leadership	bears	a	heavy	responsibility	–	but	particularly	the	Pashinyan	administration	–	when	it	had
the	open	opportunity	to	set	a	new	course	that	would	both	address	injustices	in	the	occupied	territories	and	the
economic	fears	voiced	in	the	mass	protests	that	brought	Pashinyan	to	power	in	Armenia	itself.
The	current	position	of	regression	into	nationalistic	extremism	is	both	economically	and	militarily	indefensible.
Inevitably,	for	Pashinyan	and	his	government	this	is	a	truth	that	must	–	sooner	or	later	–	be	aired	publicly	with	his
own	populace:	not	doing	so	would	likely	lead	to	a	heavy	price	being	paid	at	the	ballot	box.	It	is	an	unenviable
choice,	to	be	sure.	Yet	the	faster	the	facts	and	fiction	are	separated	and	the	reality	of	Azerbaijan’s	legal	ownership
and	offer	to	build	something	better	for	both	countries	is	acknowledged,	the	sooner	the	conflict	can	end	and	a	better
life	can	begin.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	World	Economic	Forum	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
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